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Boltanski, Luc (1940–) 
 
Simon Susen, City University London, London, UK 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article provides a brief introduction to the life and work of Luc Boltanski, who is widely regarded as one of the most 
inﬂuential French sociologists of the late twentieth and early twenty-ﬁrst centuries. The article is divided into two main parts. 
The ﬁrst part offers a summary of Boltanski’s biographical trajectory and academic career. The second part gives a compre- 
hensive overview of Boltanski’s major works and intellectual contributions. The concluding section presents a short 
assessment of Boltanski’s overall impact upon the contemporary social sciences, particularly in terms of the international 
relevance of his writings. The bibliography contains key primary and secondary sources, reﬂecting not only the proliﬁc 
development of Boltanski’s oeuvre, but also the strong inﬂuence his work has had, and continues to have, on cutting-edge 
forms of social and political analysis. 
 
 
Biographical Facts 
 
Luc Boltanski is widely regarded as one of the most inﬂuential 
French sociologists of the late twentieth and early twenty-ﬁrst 
centuries. He is one of the leading ﬁgures of the ‘pragmatic’ 
tradition within contemporary social and political thought. 
More speciﬁcally, he – along with Laurent Thévenot – is one of 
the founding ﬁgures of an approach that he himself charac- 
terizes as the ‘pragmatic sociology of critique.’ 
Boltanski was born in 1940. He studied social sciences at 
the University of Paris, La Sorbonne, and completed his Thèse 
de troisième cycle in 1968. This dissertation – entitled Prime 
éducation et morale de classe – was supervised by Raymond Aron; 
it was published in 1969 and subsequently translated into 
Italian and Spanish. Boltanski was awarded a Doctorat d’État in 
1981 for his thesis entitled Les cadres. La formation d’un groupe 
social; this study, completed under the supervision of Pierre 
Ansart, was published in 1982. 
Throughout his career Boltanski has been based at the École 
des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris, France. At 
the EHESS, he has held three major academic positions: Chef de 
travaux (1965–69), Maître de conférences (1970–81), and 
Directeur d’études (since 1982). 
Between 1965 and 1984, he was a member of the Centre de 
Sociologie Européenne (EHESS/CNRS), directed by Pierre 
Bourdieu. In 1985, he – together with Laurent Thévenot – co-
founded the Groupe de Sociologie Politique et Morale (GSPM, 
EHESS/CNRS), of which he was the director between 1985 and 
1992. At the GSPM, he carried out several research projects and 
led numerous research programs until its closure in 2013. He 
has been a Visiting Professor at various universities, both in 
Europe and in the United States, and he was a member of the 
Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University during  
the academic year 1991–92. Currently, he is a member of the 
Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire sur les Enjeux Sociaux 
(Sciences Sociales, Politique, Santé) (IRIS, EHESS). 
In the early 1970s, Boltanski was involved in launching the 
journal Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, when his research 
was still profoundly inﬂuenced by the works of his academic 
mentor, Pierre Bourdieu. In the mid-1980s, however, Boltanski 
dissociated himself from Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology,’ in order 
to create his own research program, commonly described as the 
‘sociology of critique’ or, more recently, as the ‘pragmatic 
sociology of critique.’ 
Between 1965 and 1982, Boltanski’s key research interests 
were directed toward the sociology of social classes and social 
stratiﬁcation (mainly within the following areas: bodily and 
medical practices, education, social classiﬁcations, and moral 
norms). Between 1983 and 2009, his sociological investiga- 
tions were concerned, primarily, with two areas of interest: ﬁrst, 
different notions of justice, particularly in relation to disputes and 
critique; and, second, transformations of capitalism, especially 
those taking place between the early 1960s and the late 1990s. 
In relation to these research foci, Boltanski has sought to 
develop a ‘sociology of critique,’ based on empirical ﬁeldwork 
undertaken in a number of domains, such as the media, state 
policies, management, as well as new forms of work and 
organization. 
In 2008, Boltanski delivered the Adorno Lectures at  
Frankfurt, which were subsequently published as De la critique. 
Précis de sociologie de l’émancipation (Paris: Gallimard, 2009). In 
2012, he was awarded the Lauréat du 1er prix Pétrarque de l’essai 
France Culture/Le Monde (2012) for his study Énigm es et 
complots. Une enquête à propos d’enquêtes (Paris: Gallimard, 
2012). 
As reﬂected in the themes examined in Énigmes et complots, 
Boltanski has recently embarked upon a critical study of the 
construction of the modern European nation-state, notably in 
terms of its systemic capacity to reduce the multiple uncer- 
tainties permeating social life. One key issue with which he has 
been grappling in this context is the question of the extent to 
which the tension-laden project of the European nation-state 
has triggered the emergence of ‘new forms of representation’ 
in the humanities and social sciences. 
 
 
Major Works and Contributions 
 
Boltanski has produced a large number  of  single-authored  
and co-authored books, edited and co-edited volumes, book 
chapters, and journal articles. In addition, he has written and 
published poetry, and more recently, theater plays. For  the 
sake of brevity, the summary provided in this section shall 
focus on his most inﬂuential sociological works. 
 
 
 
  
 
I 
Les cadres. La formation d’un groupe social (Paris: Minuit, 1982) 
[The Making of a Class. Cadres in French Society (Trans. Arthur 
Goldhammer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)] 
(Boltanski, 1982; see also Boltanski, 1987[1982]). 
As mentioned above, this book is based on the thesis for 
which Boltanski – under the supervision of Pierre Ansart – was 
awarded a Doctorat d’État in 1981. It provides an in-depth study 
of les cadres, that is, of a powerful social group made up of 
business leaders, managers, directors, chiefs, supervisors, and 
executives. One of the deﬁning features of this group is that it 
projects the image of a new class, which is neither bourgeois nor 
proletarian. Its members may be described as ‘highly compe- 
tent,’ ‘highly skilled,’ ‘highly motivated,’ and both politically 
and economically ‘highly inﬂuential.’ Yet, far from portraying 
them as a homogenous cluster of social actors, Boltanski 
stresses their internal diversity. He does so by drawing upon the 
information provided in numerous interviews conducted with 
representatives of this group, enabling him to deconstruct the 
myth that the emergence of les cadres can be regarded as a quasi- 
natural outcome of social, economic, and technological progress. 
One of Boltanski’s most signiﬁcant achievements in this 
study is to have demonstrated the immense internal hetero- 
geneity, along with the profound structural fragility, charac- 
terizing les cadres. His ﬁne-grained analysis illustrates that the 
portrayal of this social group as a uniform and homogenous 
collective force, as well as its triumphalist celebration as the 
protagonist of a new meritocratic era based on prosperity and 
progress, must be rejected as a reductive misrepresentation of 
what is – in reality – a highly complex, heterogeneous, and 
volatile assemblage of actors. 
Critics may have plausible reservations about the Franco- 
centric – and, hence, geographically and sociopolitically 
limited – scope of this enquiry. Indeed, the English translation 
of the original French La formation d’un groupe social (The Making 
of a Social Group) into The Making of a Class may – contrary to 
Boltanski’s intentions – convey the misleading impression that 
les cadres form a social class, rather than a social group. Such 
an assumption seems untenable, given the fragmented and 
unstable constitution of their material and symbolic resources 
for action, of their internal organizational structure, and of their 
members’ trajectories. In the contemporary era, a signiﬁcant 
sociological challenge consists in exploring the extent to which 
les cadres continue to play a pivotal role in shaping social, 
economic, political, and ideological developments both in and 
beyond France. 
 
 
II 
L’amour et la justice comme compètences. Trois essais de sociologie de 
l’action (Paris: Métailié, 1990) [Love and Justice as Competences 
(Trans. Catherine Porter, Cambridge: Polity, 2012)] (Boltanski, 
1990; see also Boltanski, 2012[1990]). 
This book is of crucial importance in that it is one of the ﬁrst 
works marking Boltanski’s unambiguous rupture with the 
sociological approach developed by his academic mentor, Pierre 
Bourdieu. To be precise, it is Boltanski’s ﬁrst major single- 
authored study that makes an explicit attempt to challenge the 
arguably scientistic, positivistic, and fatalistic presuppositions 
 
 
underpinning Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology.’ In essence, this 
treatise accomplishes this by arguing that people care a great 
deal about justice. To be exact, Boltanski starts from the 
assumption that ordinary actors engage – enthusiastically and 
critically – in everyday disputes over different – and, in many 
respects, competing – conceptions of justice. It is particularly in 
situations in which people’s sense of justice is challenged, 
affronted, or disturbed that they are likely to engage in subtle or 
open confrontations with others. Unlike Bourdieu, however, 
Boltanski posits that – instead of acting mainly in strategic, 
instrumental, utility-driven, or calculating ways – subjects 
capable of reﬂection and justiﬁcation are able to engage in 
intersubjectively constituted processes of discourse and argu- 
mentation, thereby raising claims to validity in relation to 
different sets of normativity. 
People’s practical construction of, intuitive immersion in, 
and critical engagement with ‘regimes of justice’ can be consid- 
ered central to the value-laden unfolding of social life. No less 
important, in this respect, is the socio-ontological role of what 
Boltanski refers to as the ‘regime of peace’ and the ‘regime of love’ 
(agapè), whose existence is due to the fact that some actions are 
selﬂess and gratuitous. What all of these grammatically struc- 
tured regimes of action – between which people, in their 
everyday lives, move back and forth – have in common is that 
they require its protagonists to refuse to draw on their capacity 
for violence, which can manifest itself in various – notably, 
physical, symbolic, and structural – forms of power. 
As members of a ‘common humanity,’ we are equipped 
with the normative capacity to establish ‘orders of worth’ in the 
pursuit of the ‘common good,’ which transcends the divisive 
logic of competitive position-taking and merely strategic per- 
formativity. One of the main contributions of Boltanski’s Love 
and Justice as Competences, therefore, is to have shed light on the 
moral foundations of society by taking seriously people’s ability to 
engage in the construction of everyday forms of normativity. In 
other words, this book is a powerful reminder that our capacity 
to mobilize the reﬂexive resources embedded in our critical 
capacity permits us to build meaningful social relations based 
on a genuine concern with justice, love, and reciprocity. 
 
 
III 
De la justiﬁcation. Les économies de la grandeur (avec Laurent 
Thévenot, Paris: Gallimard, 1991) [On Justiﬁcation. Economies of 
Worth (with Laurent Thévenot, trans. Catherine Porter, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006)] (Boltanski and 
Thévenot, 1991; see also Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006[1991]). 
This study provides numerous useful insights into the pivotal 
role that processes of justiﬁcation play in the construction of 
social life. These can be synthesized in terms of the following 
levels of analysis: 
1. Ordinary actors are equipped with critical, moral, and judgmental 
capacities. Owing to their ability to participate – actively 
and reﬂexively – in the meaning- and value-laden construc- 
tion of different forms of sociality, their claims to objective, 
normative, or subjective validity are irreducible to mere 
epiphenomena of an interest- and power-laden struggle for 
legitimacy in ﬁeld-speciﬁc – and, hence, positionally deter- 
mined and dispositionally reproduced – realities. 
  
 
 
2. Any attempt to construct a hierarchy between ‘ordinary knowl- 
edge’ and ‘social-scientiﬁc knowledge’ is epistemologically 
erroneous, methodologically counterproductive, sociologi- 
cally untenable, politically patronizing, and philosophically 
fatalistic. To be sure, the point is not to deny that there are 
substantial qualitative differences between ‘scientiﬁc anal- 
ysis’ and ‘common sense.’ It is crucial, however, to concede 
that these two levels of epistemic engagement with speciﬁc 
aspects of reality are not as far apart as they may appear at 
ﬁrst glance. Instead of undertaking a clear-cut ‘epistemo- 
logical break’ with the doxic illusions of common sense, the 
challenge consists in exploring the extent to which ordinary 
people’s critical capacity constitutes a precondition for, 
rather than an obstacle to, the possibility of reﬂection and 
justiﬁcation in all normatively codiﬁed settings of social 
interaction. 
3. All activities of justiﬁcation have both grammatical and proces- 
sual dimensions, which can be empirically studied and 
conceptually grasped. Given their grammatical constitu- 
tion, activities of justiﬁcation are structured by context- 
speciﬁc logics of rationalization, argumentation, and 
valorization. Given their processual constitution, the 
underlying objective, normative, or subjective parameters 
mobilized in order to justify a belief or an action are not 
only in a constant state of ﬂux, but also contingent upon 
the changing sets of circumstances in which they are 
applied by those making claims to validity and  aiming  
to obtain empowering degrees of legitimacy. Different 
cités (polities) may be regarded as idiosyncratic mondes 
(worlds) capable of establishing different grandeurs (orders 
of worth) with different conceptions of bien comun 
(common good), whose validity can be conﬁrmed or 
undermined by means of different épreuves (tests). Irre- 
spective of the spatiotemporal speciﬁcity of a social situa- 
tion, there are no practices of meaning- and value-laden 
interaction without both grammars and processes of 
justiﬁcation. 
4. There are multiple normative orders with corresponding regimes of 
justiﬁcation and modes of evaluation. Six ‘worlds’, with corre- 
sponding ‘orders of worth,’ are particularly important: ‘the 
inspired world,’ ‘the domestic world,’ ‘the civic world,’ ‘the 
world of opinion and fame,’ ‘the world of  the  market,’ and 
‘the   industrial    world.’    These    ‘worlds’    possess    both   
a ‘quotidian’ and a ‘metaphysical’ dimension: 
a. Their ‘quotidian,’ and thus ‘ordinary,’ constitution is re- 
ﬂected in the fact that these ‘worlds’ permeate the 
normative structure of people’s everyday practices, as they 
ﬁnd themselves immersed in different regimes of action 
and justiﬁcation when navigating their way through the 
social universe. The experiences of passion (‘inspired’), 
trust (‘domestic’), solidarity (‘civic’), recognition 
(‘fame’), exchange value (‘market’), and productivity 
(‘industry’) are built into ‘orders of worth’ by means of 
which actors engage with, and attribute meaning to, 
reality on a day-to-day basis. 
b. Their ‘metaphysical’ or simply ‘philosophical’ constitution 
is expressed in the fact that the systematic concern with 
the ontological signiﬁcance of these ‘worlds’ can be 
traced back to the writings of classical, social, and 
political thinkers: St. Augustine (‘the inspired world’), 
 
 
Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (‘the domestic world’), Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau (‘the civic world’), Thomas Hobbes 
(‘the world of fame’), Adam Smith (‘the world of the 
market’), and Henri de Saint Simon (‘the industrial 
world’). 
5. Social actors are obliged to possess a certain degree of realism 
when engaging in disputes. Put differently, people’s partici- 
pation in the normative construction of social life is 
inconceivable without their competence to assess what is 
possible, and what is not possible, when faced with a given 
set of materially and symbolically organized circumstances. 
People’s capacity to be realistic in terms of what they can, 
and cannot, achieve within particular situations is a praxe- 
ological precondition for their ability to make judgments 
about – and, if required, take decisions in relation to – 
speciﬁc issues at stake in changing settings of interaction. 
Just as they are obliged to make compromises, they are ex- 
pected to be able to cope with the fact that overt or hidden 
conﬂicts form an ineluctable component of social existence. 
Since, in their everyday lives, they are constantly required to 
position themselves in relation to normatively codiﬁed 
forms of action, they cannot escape the need to engage in 
processes of justiﬁcation. 
 
IV 
La souffrance à distance. Morale humanitaire, medias et politique 
(Paris: Métailié, 1993; Paris: Gallimard, 2007  (Extended 
version)) [Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics (Trans. 
Graham D. Burchell, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999)] (Boltanski, 1993; see also Boltanski, 1999[1993]). 
This book provides an interdisciplinary analysis of ‘distant 
suffering,’ that is, of the experience and effects of perceiving 
processes of human grief and misery ‘from a distance.’ Perhaps, 
the most fundamental sociological issue with which Boltanski 
grapples in this study is the question of how human actors react 
when exposed to spectacles of suffering, while being 
geographically remote from the locations in which tragic or 
catastrophic events occur. Seeking to respond to this question, 
Boltanski unearths various sociological, political, moral, 
psychological, and ﬁctional accounts concerned with the 
impact of ‘distant suffering’ upon those who experience it. 
The book comprises three main parts. In Part I, entitled ‘The 
Question of the Spectator,’ Boltanski explores the normative 
issues arising from a set of principles and practices to which he 
refers as ‘the politics of pity.’ In Part II, entitled ‘The Topics of 
Suffering,’ Boltanski draws on literacy sources to examine 
several intermediary elements that inﬂuence the spectator’s 
rational and emotional reactions to gruesome  media portrayals. 
In Part III, entitled ‘The Crisis of Pity,’ Boltanski reﬂects on the 
implications of the fact that spectators can be converted into 
moral and political actors, particularly when passing value 
judgments on the alleged facts and happenings to which they 
are exposed via the media. 
In the digital age, those who have direct and regular access 
to the mass media are habitually exposed to horriﬁc images – 
such as starving children, bombed villages, war,  genocide,  
and mass graves. It is far from clear, however, what it means to 
respond accurately and responsibly to such scenarios. For 
Boltanski, there is no doubt that, in order to overcome
  
 
 
 
a paralyzing state of sensationalism and voyeurism, spectators 
must rise above mere feelings of empathy and compassion. The 
‘politics of pity’ is unsatisfactory in the sense that it encourages 
consumers of mediated misery to focus on the spectacle of 
suffering, thereby requiring them to observe the unfortunate, 
rather than to scrutinize – let alone to act upon – the socio- 
historical roots behind their deprivation. Boltanski, therefore, 
urges his readers to imagine possibilities of action and thereby 
challenge the constraining limitations, and detrimental 
consequences, of the largely passive consumption of informa- 
tion. Granted, the shift from a potentially disempowering 
‘world of representation’ to a genuinely empowering ‘world of 
action’ is complex. Yet, the Boltanskian idea of a political and 
moral sociology cannot be dissociated from the conviction that 
subjects capable of reﬂection and justiﬁcation are able to 
mobilize their critical resources in order to engage in norma- 
tively defensible and performatively empowering forms of 
action. 
 
 
V 
Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme (avec Ève Chiapello, Paris: 
Gallimard,  1999)  [The  New  Spirit  of   Capitalism   (with  
Ève Chiapello, Trans. Gregory Elliott, London: Verso, 2005)] 
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999; see also Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2005[1999]). 
This book provides a cutting-edge analysis of the emergence 
of what Boltanski and Chiapello describe as the ‘new spirit of 
capitalism’ in the late twentieth century. Shortly after its orig- 
inal publication in 1999, this study became a bestseller in 
France. According to Boltanski and Chiapello’s analysis, we can 
distinguish three spirits of capitalism: 
l The ﬁrst spirit, prevalent in early modern societies, can be 
characterized as family capitalism, in the sense that it prior- 
itizes the individual ﬁgure of the bourgeois proprietor and 
ﬁnds its ideological justiﬁcation, above all, in the ‘domestic 
city.’ It is intimately interrelated with the productive ethos of 
Weber’s famous Protestant Ethic. Sweeping away the rigid 
social, political, and economic structures of feudal- 
absolutist formations, the constitutive component of the 
‘ﬁrst spirit of capitalism’ is productivism. 
l  The second spirit can be referred to as industrial or 
organizational capitalism, epitomized in the protagonist 
role of ‘the manager,’ whose societal function is associated 
with ‘organization man.’ Emerging in response to the crisis 
of 1929– 30, it is composed of a combination of Fordist 
industrialism and Keynesian interventionism, which may be 
interpreted as a trade-off between Rousseau’s ‘civic city’ 
and St. Simon’s ‘industrial city.’ The societal constellation 
generated by this historic settlement had two major 
consequences: (a) it contributed to enhancing the 
acquisitive power of the working classes in particular and 
people’s chances to beneﬁt from upward social mobility in 
general; and (b) it contributed to the rise of a relatively 
autonomous salaried professional labor force, especially in 
the liberal professions, arts and sciences, and public sector. 
l The third spirit manifests itself, most clearly, in the city 
of projects, in which market-driven principles – such as ‘ﬂex- 
ibility,’ ‘adaptability,’ ‘creativity,’ and ‘mobility’ – play a 
pivotal role in developing an ever-more elastic, and seem- 
ingly forward-looking, capitalist system. Also described as the 
new spirit of capitalism, it is inextricably linked to the rise of 
neoliberalism and neomanagerialism, especially from the 
1970s onward, indicating the restoration of large-scale market 
discipline along with a shift toward the increasing ﬁnanciali- 
zation of capital ﬂows. One of the paradoxical achievements 
of this ‘new spirit’ is to have succeeded in appropriating the 
subversive forces that sought to undermine the legitimacy of 
capitalism for its own purposes. The elastic and ﬂexible 
nature of this ‘new spirit’ emanates from capitalism’s capacity 
to promote and integrate discursive processes of debate and 
critique, thereby ensuring that, as a politico-economic 
system, it is both structurally and ideologically highly 
adaptable. The idea of dominating by change is essential to 
contemporary forms of social domination. 
The rise of the ‘network man’ illustrates not only the 
emergence of a new systemic and ideological modus operandi of 
capitalism, but also its new spirit’s capacity to take seriously 
four sources of indignation: inauthenticity, oppression, misery and 
inequality, and egoism. The former two were central objects of 
different versions of artistic critique and the latter two were 
principal matters of concern under the umbrella of social 
critique. It is one of Boltanski and Chiapello’s noteworthy 
achievements to have demonstrated, with considerable 
empirical evidence and conceptual precision, that most 
contemporary forms of capitalism possess the capacity to 
incorporate normative processes based on critical discourse into 
their mode of functioning. In this sense, categorical openness 
to debate, controversy, and constant re-assessment has been 
converted into one of the normative cornerstones underlying 
the ‘new spirit of capitalism.’ 
 
 
VI 
La condition fœtale. Une sociologie de l’engendrement et de l’av- 
ortement (Paris: Gallimard, 2004) [The Foetal Condition (Trans. 
Catherine Porter, Cambridge: Polity, 2013)] (Boltanski,  2004;  
see also Boltanski, 2013[2004]). 
Undoubtedly, this is one of Boltanski’s most controversial 
books – possibly, because it deals with one of the most 
contentious issues in contemporary society: abortion. In this 
study, Boltanski draws upon accounts and statements collected 
from hospital settings as well as upon in-depth interviews 
conducted with women who have undergone abortions. In his 
insightful socio-philosophical interpretation of the discursive 
data upon which this enquiry is based, he directs his readers’ 
attention to the profound ambivalence that appears to be built 
into abortion as a social practice. To be precise, for Boltanski, 
abortion exposes a contradiction that is inherent in all human 
life forms: on the one hand, we assume that individual human 
beings are unique and distinctive; on the other hand, we are 
confronted with their replaceable and disposable nature, without 
which there would be no demographic renewal and no societal 
regeneration. 
Boltanski, therefore, proposes to examine the ways in which 
human beings are engendered by dissecting the symbolically 
mediated controls and constraints that are imposed upon them 
by society, of which they can become fully-ﬂedged members 
  
 
 
only to the extent that they are both willing and able to share 
its – normatively charged – conception of species-constitutive 
existence. On this view, a fetus is not a human  being  ‘in  
itself,’ ensconced within the female body, but, rather, a human 
being ‘for itself,’ to the degree that it is symbolically constructed 
and discursively considered as such by the members of a given 
society. For Boltanski, one twofold categorization is particu- 
larly important in this regard: the project fetus and the tumoral 
fetus. The former is desired by its parents, who attribute positive 
characteristics – such as ‘meaningfulness,’ ‘fulﬁlment,’ ‘love,’ 
and ‘life plans’ – to its existence. The latter is deprived of the 
privilege of forming an integral element of a parental endeavor 
and, in extreme-case scenarios, may be reducible to a nameless, 
replaceable, and undesired form of being, whose non-existence 
is preferred to its existence by those who have the power to 
decide over its future. 
In the human world, then, sexual reproduction is never 
simply a biological affair but always also a process of social 
construction, especially in terms of how it is both interpreted 
and regulated by members of particular cultural life forms. 
Boltanski demonstrates, in a neo Durkheimian fashion, that 
every social order constitutes a moral order: a set of interrelated 
practices performed by ethically responsible actors whose 
decisions – irrespective of whether these are made consciously 
and unconsciously – have normative implications both for 
those who undertake them and for those who are, directly or 
indirectly, affected by them. Whatever one makes of Boltanski’s 
analysis, owing to the contentious nature of this subject, The 
Foetal Condition cannot fail to challenge – and, in some cases, 
irritate – those contributing to contemporary controversies 
concerning abortion. 
 
 
VII 
De la critique. Précis de sociologie de l’émancipation (Paris: 
Gallimard, 2009) [On Critique: A Sociology of Emancipation 
(Trans. Gregory Elliott, Cambridge: Polity, 2011)] (Boltanski, 
2009; see also Boltanski, 2011[2009]) 
Arguably, On Critique is Boltanski’s most philosophical 
book. It provides an in-depth analysis of the conceptual 
underpinnings of the ‘pragmatic sociology of critique,’ focusing 
on the following six key dimensions: 
1. Boltanski reﬂects on the task of critical theories. One of 
their vital concerns is the sustained effort to scrutinize the 
causes, symptoms, and consequences of power relations 
within particular historical contexts, especially those that 
are entrenched in societal systems of domination. In this 
respect, a fundamental difference between Bourdieu and 
Boltanski becomes evident. According to the former, ordi- 
nary people are largely unconscious of the workings, and 
essentially naive about the implications, of power relations. 
According to the latter, ordinary people are not only 
conscious of, and realistic about, power relations but also able 
to problematize the tangible implications of their existence. 
For Bourdieu, it is the task of ‘critical sociologists’ to uncover 
the underlying mechanisms that determine the asymmet- 
rical structures permeating the interest-laden practices of 
strategic agents, who compete for material and symbolic 
resources. For Boltanski, by contrast, it is the mission of 
 
 
‘sociologists of critique’ to recognize that human beings are 
moral and reﬂexive actors, whose critical capacity permits 
them to assess – and, if necessary, justify – the normative 
validity of their performances. 
2. Boltanski aims to reconcile Bourdieu’s critical sociology with his 
own pragmatic sociology of critique. Thus, he seeks to combine 
and cross-fertilize two seemingly antagonistic approaches. 
The former appears to advocate social determinism and posi- 
tivist scientism, favoring the epistemic capacities of scientists 
over those of everyday actors, who seem to be deluded by 
doxic preconceptions based on common sense. The latter 
appears to endorse social pragmatism and interpretivist nor- 
mativism,  proposing  to  take  ordinary  people  seriously  
in terms of both their performative capacity to shape the 
world and their discursive capacity to provide reasonable 
justiﬁcations for their beliefs and actions. Rather than 
conceiving of these two sociological approaches as dia- 
metrically opposed and irreconcilable, Boltanski aims to 
demonstrate that useful insights can be gained not only 
from comparing and contrasting, but also from combining 
and integrating, these two paradigmatic frameworks. 
3. Boltanski grapples with the principal functions of social 
institutions. Their most essential task, it seems, consists in 
producing solidiﬁed – or, at least, seemingly solidiﬁed – 
realms of social interaction, enabling  humans  to  cope  
with the uncertainty inherent in all worldly life forms. 
Boltanski draws an important distinction between ‘world’ 
(‘monde’) and ‘reality’ (‘réalité ’). While the former encom- 
passes ‘everything that is the case,’ the latter comprises 
‘everything that is constructed.’ Put differently, the world is 
‘everything that happens to people,’ while reality is ‘every- 
thing that is constructed by people.’ To the extent that 
institutions convert our encounter with the world into an 
experience founded on the illusion of relative certainty, they 
can be regarded as a conditio sine qua non of the material and 
symbolic construction of reality. Institutions, therefore, 
constitute ‘bodiless beings’ that fulﬁll the task of deﬁning 
what Boltanski calls ‘the whatness of what is’ or, to be exact, 
‘the whatness of what appears to be.’ 
4. Boltanski examines the role of critique in the normative 
consolidation of social life. Critique constitutes a driving 
force of historical change: it permits both individual and 
collective actors to shape the development of society in 
accordance with their discursively articulated search for 
principles that are defensible in terms of their practical 
worth and normative validity. For Boltanski, two registers of 
action are crucial in this respect. On the one hand, the 
practical register is characterized by relatively weak and rudi- 
mentary levels of reﬂexivity, presupposing a considerable 
tolerance for differences and discrepancies, as well as 
sustaining a set of codiﬁed arrangements that guarantee the 
reproduction of society. On the other hand, the meta- 
pragmatic register is marked by rather elevated and differenti- 
ated levels of reﬂexivity, involving an implicit or explicit 
reference to the normative force of critique and, at the same 
time, allowing for the articulation of two metapragmatic 
forces: conﬁrmation and justiﬁcation. People’s ability to 
conﬁrm and justify the legitimacy of their actions is central 
to their capacity to participate in the construction of 
normatively regulated constellations. 
  
 
Confronted with hermeneutic contradictions emanating 
from the potential discrepancies between ‘world’ and 
‘reality,’ human actors are in a position to question the 
apparent givenness of objectivity by facing up to the 
genuine arbitrariness of all forms of normativity. Illus- 
trating the ‘pragmatic’ dimension of Boltanski’s framework, 
it is crucial to recognize that processes of critique cannot be 
dissociated from three types of ‘test’ (épreuve) undertaken 
either to reinforce or to undermine the legitimacy of a speciﬁc 
ensemble of social constellations: (a) ‘truth tests’ (épreuves 
de vérité), (b) ‘reality tests’ (épreuves de réalité), and (c) 
‘existential tests’ (épreuves existentielles). From a Boltanskian 
perspective, the emancipatory transformation of society is 
inconceivable without a critical engagement with the 
normative constitution of reality. 
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of dominant social groups and thereby contribute to a more 
balanced distribution of capacities for action. To be sure, Boltanski 
does not propose a utopian blueprint envisaging the 
construction of a perfect society. Owing to the anthropolog- 
ical optimism that undergirds his writings, however, he 
dares to believe that the construction of a world based on 
emancipatory life  forms  is  both  desirable  and  possible.  
Such a world would not be determined by constraining 
sources of social domination, such as privilege, status, and 
authority. Rather, it would be shaped, above all, by people’s 
purposive, cooperative, and creative capacities allowing for 
individual and collective experiences of self-realization. 
5. Boltanski discusses the concept of domination. More specif- 
ically, he draws a distinction between two fundamental 
types of domination: simple domination or primitive domina- 
tion, on the one hand, and complex domination or managerial 
domination, on the other. 
‘Simple forms of domination are monolithic in the sense that, 
under their authority, control over a particular population is 
monopolized by a state or overarching institution. Here, 
people are deprived of fundamental liberties (such as 
freedom of speech, expression, and communication) as well 
as of basic rights (such as civil, political, social, economic, 
and human rights). Under regimes of ‘simple domination,’ 
the exercise of power is relatively arbitrary and unambigu- 
ously asymmetrical. Obvious historical examples of this type 
of domination include absolutism, fascism, and any kind 
of dictatorial government whose exercise of power is moti- 
vated by normative principles based on political 
authoritarianism. 
‘Complex forms of domination are polycentric – or, in a more 
radical sense, even centreless – in the sense that, under their 
inﬂuence, power structures are circular, amorphous, volatile, 
and in a constant state of ﬂux, lacking an institutional or 
ideological epicenter. Here, people’s essential liberties and 
rights are not only largely respected, or even defended, but 
also instrumentalized in order to foster the legitimacy of the 
hegemonic political and economic system in place. Under 
regimes of ‘complex domination,’ the exercise of power is – 
at least in principle – democratic and – albeit, admittedly, to 
varying degrees – criticizable. Contemporary scenarios that 
can be described in these terms are democratic–capitalist 
societies, shaped by cultures and institutions based on 
political pluralism and, hence, by the fact that critique is 
incorporated into the routines of everyday life. For Boltan- 
ski, then, the emergence of the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ is 
inextricably linked to the possibility of dominating by change, 
which is based on categorical openness to criticism and, 
thus, on the capacity to obtain legitimacy by advocating the 
aforementioned neomanagerial ideals, such as ‘ﬂexibility,’ 
‘adaptability,’ ‘creativity,’ and ‘mobility.’ 
 
6. Boltanski expresses his own view of the conditions underlying 
processes of human emancipation. In his eyes, these processes 
are based on individual or collective practices that promote the 
critical project of a reduction in the material and symbolic privileges 
Enigmes et complots. Une enquête à propos d’enquêtes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 2012) [Mysteries and Conspiracies: Detective Stories, 
Spy Novels and the Making of Modern Societies, trans. Catherine 
Porter (Cambridge: Polity, 2014)] (Boltanski, 2012; see also 
Boltanski, 2014[2012]). 
In this book, Boltanski draws an analogy between two 
domains of modern writing, which, at ﬁrst glance, do not appear 
to have anything signiﬁcant in common: on the one hand, the 
development of two literary genres, namely detective stories, which 
are based on methodical enquiries, as well as spy novels, which are 
built around plots and conspiracies; on the other hand, the 
development of the human and social sciences, which are founded 
not only on systematic investigations but also on what may be 
described as the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion.’ Particularly 
important, in this regard, are the following three scientiﬁc 
disciplines: psychiatry, known for fabricating seemingly evidence- 
based conceptions of paranoia; sociology, inspired by the 
enlightening mission to uncover the underlying causal forces 
that determine both the constitution and the evolution of the 
social world; and political science, seeking to explain the origins of 
major historical events by reference to conspiracy theories. 
Thus, what detective stories and spy novels have in common 
with the human and social sciences is not only the fact that they 
emerged – and underwent profound paradigmatic transitions – 
in the same historical context, that is, in the late nineteenth and 
the early twentieth centuries, but also the fact that they are driven 
by the ambition to shed light on the mysteries and conspiracies 
whose existence escapes people’s ordinary perception of reality. 
Hence, they seek to call taken-for-granted assumptions about the 
world into question, by providing logically coherent accounts, 
and evidence-based explanations, of the multiple factors inﬂu- 
encing different patterns of human action. 
According to Boltanski, the most powerful institutional 
expression of the attempt to organize and unify reality by 
regulating and controlling the behavior of a population living 
within a given territory is the modern nation-state. Central to 
his socio-historical analysis in this book is the assumption that, 
in the modern age, speculations and suspicions about conspir- 
acies became a motivational driving force behind both popular 
and academic conceptions of the exercise of power. Inevitably, 
the search for hidden sources of inﬂuence involved the ideo- 
logical construction of a dichotomously constituted reality: on 
the one hand, an ofﬁcial reality, based on appearances, public 
performances, and superﬁcial impressions; on the other hand, 
an unofﬁcial reality, founded on underlying structures, hidden
  
 
causal mechanisms, and concealed social forces. What crime 
and spy ﬁction have in common with positivist conceptions of 
science, then, is that they presuppose a discrepancy between 
these two levels of reality: ‘appearance’ versus ‘substance,’ 
‘interpretation’ versus ‘explanation,’ ‘imagination’ versus 
‘observation,’ ‘ﬁction’ versus ‘authenticity.’ 
By putting the works of major detective and spy novelists – 
such as G.K. Chesterton, Arthur Conan Doyle, John Le Carré, 
and Graham Greene – under sociological scrutiny, Boltanski 
demonstrates that their writings reveal fundamental features not 
only of ﬁction-based genre, but also of modern society, espe- 
cially with respect to the reciprocal relationship between modern 
institutions and modern science. According to Boltanski, the 
nation-state’s ambition to exercise unlimited control over the 
reality constructed within the boundaries of its territory is aimed 
at the stabilization of volatile sets of social relations. The binary 
distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘deviant,’ which undergirds 
this socio-political project of the state, is as central to detective 
and spy novels as it is to the functionalist spirit permeating the 
works of the founding ﬁgures of sociology – that is, the writings 
of Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and Max Weber. 
Boltanski emphasizes that detective stories and spy novels are 
fundamentally different in the following sense: within the 
former, the state tends to be portrayed as essentially ‘apolitical’; 
within the latter, the state tends to be conceived of as deeply 
‘political’ or even as a ‘war state.’ Given the profound uncer- 
tainty permeating capitalist societies, which are characterized 
by processes of constant and rapid technological and demo- 
graphic transformation, spy novels and the social sciences serve 
a complementary function: in the early modern era, the wide- 
spread diffusion of the term ‘paranoia’ is inextricably linked to 
the paradigms of ‘conspiracy’ and ‘suspicion,’ which inform the 
exploratory spirit pervading both spy novels and positivistically 
inspired social science – especially psychiatry, sociology, and 
political science. Boltanski has illustrated – with great skill and 
considerable eloquence – that the hermeneutics of investigation, 
which one encounters in detective stories, and the hermeneutics 
of conspiracy, which is central to most spy novels, contain 
signiﬁcant historical and presuppositional similarities with the 
hermeneutics of suspicion, which lies at the heart of the founding 
disciplines of the human and social sciences. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Given the wide-ranging scope and scholarly originality of Bol- 
tanski’s writings, it may hardly be surprising that he is generally 
regarded as one of the most prominent contemporary French 
sociologists. In fact, his considerable inﬂuence manifests itself in 
the emergence of an extensive secondary literature concerned 
with the multifaceted aspects of his oeuvre. His inﬂuence spans 
far beyond Francophone (see, e.g.: Bénatouïl, 1999a; Gadrey  
et al., 2001; Nachi, 2006; Negri, 1994; Susen, 2012; Thévenot, 
2006) spheres of social and political thought. Indeed, his 
international impact on current academic debates is reﬂected, 
particularly, in recent and ongoing Germanophone (see, e.g.: 
Bogusz, 2010; Boltanski and Honneth, 2009; Celikates, 2009: 
esp. 136–157) and Anglophone (see, e.g.: Bénatouïl, 1999b; 
Blokker, 2011; Honneth, 2010; Susen, 2007: 7, 146n.8, 
147n.31,    167n.5,   202n.89,   202n.93,   223–224,   227n.25, 
 
 
228n.50, 229n.51, 229n.52, 271n.24, 319, 322, and 325; Susen, 
2011b: 370;  Susen, 2011a:  esp. 447–450,  453–456, and 459– 
461; Susen and Turner, 2014; Wagner, 1999) controversies 
concerned with both the empirical and the conceptual signiﬁ- 
cance of his various contributions to the humanities and social 
sciences. While it would be erroneous to reduce Boltanski’s 
project to a mere – albeit sophisticated – response to the work of 
his academic ‘patron,’ Bourdieu, there is no doubt that his 
proposed paradigm shift from ‘critical sociology’ to a ‘pragmatic 
sociology of critique’ has opened hitherto unexplored intellec- 
tual avenues in the attempt to do justice to the pivotal role 
that critical capacity plays not only in the pursuit of sociology, 
but also, more fundamentally, in the daily construction of 
society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note 
 
A more detailed version of this article was published in Susen 
and Turner (2014); see Susen (2014). 
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